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Note
Putting the Use Back in Metropolitan Land-Use
Planning: Private Enforcement of Urban Sprawl
Control Laws
James Poradek*
In November 1993, more than two hundred angry residents descended on city hall in Maple Grove, 1 a rapidly growing Minneapolis suburb.' The crowd converged to protest the
proposed townhouse development for low- to moderate-income
residents in one of Maple Grove's affluent neighborhoods.3 The
residents voiced fears that the new townhouse residents would
imperil the community's safety.' Faced with this emotional
5
opposition, Maple Grove's city council tabled the project.
Although after several months of intense pressure from
several sources Maple Grove's city council finally voted to approve the townhouses, 6 a newly released study7 showed that
* J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1988,
Rutgers College. The author would like to thank Myron Orfield for his valuable insight.
1. Mike Kaszuba, Maple Grove Tables Low-Income ProjectAfter Angry
Meeting, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Nov. 18, 1993, at lB.
2. At the time, Maple Grove was the fifth fastest growing municipality
in the region. Mike Kaszuba, Maple Grove Low-Income Housing OK'd, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis), Dec. 21, 1993, at 7B. Between 1970 and 1990 Maple
Grove more than quadrupled from a population of 6,275 to 38,756. By 2010,
the Metropolitan Council forecasts the city will have over 60,000 residents.
METROPOLITAN COUNcIL, AMENDMENTS TO REGIONAL BLUEPRINT 75 (1996).
3. Kaszuba, supra note 1, at lB.
4. Id. A resident police officer warned the council that such housing
would attract "those people" from the region's central cities. Id.; see also Maple Grove: A Night Ruled by Fear and Prejudice, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),
Nov. 21, 1993, at 34A [hereinafter Fear and Prejudice] (reporting that the opposition was "allegedly encouraged by a gaggle of Minneapolis cops" who persuaded residents that the development would bring the criminal element to
Maple Grove).
5. Fearand Prejudice,supra note 4, at 34A.
6. Mike Kaszuba, Maple Grove Housing Project Approval, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Mar. 12, 1994, at lB. The local media condemned the uglier
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the November rebellion was merely an example of Maple
Grove's systematic resistance to affordable housing. In Maple
Grove, a pattern of zoning and planning practices significantly
raised the cost of residential development,8 which in turn increased housing prices and excluded low- to moderate-income
families. 9 The city's own administrator acknowledged that Maple Grove's affordable-housing performance was "embarrassing
and pathetic."10 The resistance of suburban cities like Maple
Grove to provide affordable housing is, however, more than
embarrassing. Such practices create and exacerbate regional
inequities-inequities for which all metropolitan residents
must ultimately pay."
undercurrents flowing through this "night of fear and prejudice." Fear and
Prejudice, supra note 4, at 34A. For a thorough examination of the controversy and the deep-seated hostility toward the inner city from which it arose,
see Britt Robson, The Last Good Place to Live: Welcome to Maple Grove,
Where They Defend the Middle-Class Dream by Any Means Necessary, CITY
PAGES (Minneapolis), Mar. 8, 1994, at 8. Another factor influencing the city
council was the governor's appointment of a task force to examine affordable
housing in the metropolitan area. Steve Brandt, Metro Suburbs Lag in Creating Affordable Housing,Study Says, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr. 29, 1994,
at 5B.
7. BARBARA L. LUKERMANN & MICHAEL P. KANE, LAND USE PRACTICES:
ExCLuSIONARY ZONING, DE FACTO OR DE JURE? AN EXAMINATION OF THE
PRACTICES OF TEN SuBuRBAN CoMMuNrriEs IN THE TWIN CITIES METROPOLITAN AREA (1994).
8. Id. at 52-54. The authors identified a number of official standards
that made building and buying homes in Maple Grove prohibitively expensive
for many. Maple Grove's comprehensive plan heavily favored single-family
detached housing. Id. The citys minimum lot size was 25% higher than that
recommended by the Metropolitan Council. Id. at 18. Furthermore, despite
the Council's discouragement of minimum floor area standards, Maple Grove
not only employed them, but required one of the highest standards for multifamily dwellings in the region. Id. at 53.
9. Id. at 52. The Maple Grove city council's approach to the townhouse
project in the immediate aftermath of the November meeting shows how zoning can be used to exclude low-income residents without showing overt hostility. In December 1993, the city council voted to approve the project. Maple
Grove: Doing, and Undoing, the Right Thing, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Dec.
23, 1993, at 12A. However, the Metropolitan Council conditioned its approval
on a number of requirements, including two-car garages and curbs, which
threatened to defeat the financial feasibility of the development. Id. Although the council eventually relented, re-approving the project without the
expensive conditions, low-income developments out of the public eye seem less
likely to meet with so kind a fate. In 1989, Maple Grove ranked last among
the suburban cities studied in the percentage of housing stock available to
low-income families. LUKERMANN & KANE, supra note 7, at 16.
10. Brandt, supra note 6, at 5B.
11. See infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (describing the costs exclusionary zoning and sprawl impose on society).
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Minnesota's regional land planning system has earned
"national acclaim"'12 as a mechanism for preventing exactly this
kind of regional imbalance. National policymakers were especially attracted by the fact that Minnesota's Metropolitan Land
Planning Act 13 gives the Metropolitan Council 14 uniquely powerful tools to achieve fair and efficient growth throughout the
Twin Cities region. 15 Locally, however, the Council has been
heavily criticized for its passivity. 6 When Maple Grove requested that the Council increase the developable area inside
the city's boundaries soon after the townhouse controversy, 7
many observers saw a felicitous opportunity for the Council to
finally draw the line. 8 Not only did Maple Grove's zoning
techniques flout explicit Council recommendations to distribute affordable housing across the region, 9 the land-intensive
nature of these techniques caused Maple Grove to hungrily
consume buildable space.
Despite Maple Grove's well-publicized efforts to avoid affordable housing, the Council granted the city special dispensation to continue its rapid growth.20 To the added consterna12. Mike Kaszuba & Laurie Blake, A Vision Clouded: Met Council's Future Uncertainas Its Influence Drops Sharply, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr.
14, 1991, at 1A, see also Terry Jill Lassar, Sharing the Benefits and Costs of
Growth Management in Minneapolis, 50 URB. LAND, Feb. 1991, at 20 (holding
the Twin Cities up as a model for regional governance).
13. For a full discussion of the Act's provisions, see infra Part 11.C.
14. The Minnesota state legislature created the Council in 1967 as a regional planning body. See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (discussing
the Council's genesis).
15. See Lassar, supra note 12, at 20 (describing the unique implementation and enforcement powers granted to the Metropolitan Council, making the
Twin Cities the "envy" of other regional governing bodies).
16. See generally Kaszuba & Blake, supra note 12, at 14A (describing the
conservative approach adopted by the Council in the 1980s).
17. Before the deal was struck, the majority of Maple Grove's undeveloped land lay outside the boundary for regional infrastructure, so that most
new residential developments in the city would receive no metropolitan sewage. LUKERMANN & KANE, supra note 7, at 52.
18. MUSA Line: The Met Council Stumbles Again, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),
Feb. 9, 1995, at 16A [hereinafter Council Stumbles].
19. For a summary of these practices, all of which conflicted with Council
guidelines, see supra note 8. See also METROPOLITAN COUNCIL, REGIONAL
BLUEPRINT 56-59 (1994) (summarizing the Council's agenda to increase
housing diversity in the region). Ironically, the first "action step" proposed by
the Council to increase affordable housing in the suburbs would favor regional
infrastructure investments for those communities with a good housing track
record. Id. at 56.
20. Maple Grove: Development Expansion Plan Approved; City Promises
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tion of many, it did so without securing a firm commitment
from Maple Grove to alter its exclusionary zoning practices.2 1
Maple Grove promised to increase its supply of affordable
housing,2 2 but critics pointed out that the agreement proposed
housing that was not truly affordable to the lowest income
residents. 3
24
Urban sprawl has become a serious national problem.
The early promise of Minnesota's system as a model for dealing
with sprawl has remained largely unfulfilled. Instead, Minnesota has become a case study in how weak official enforcement
can undermine even the best laid metropolitan plan. This Note
proposes, therefore, that either the legislature or the courts establish a private right of action to help control sprawl. Part I
traces the troubled history of land regulation in America. Part
II examines state and regional comprehensive planning laws,
focusing on Oregon and Minnesota. Part III analyzes the
problems that persist in Minnesota and the weaknesses in the
land planning system that cause them. Finally, Part IV demonstrates the benefits of a private right of action in the context
of metropolitan sprawl control, and suggests how to adopt such
a right of action in Minnesota.
Affordable Housing, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 31, 1995, at 7B [hereinafter
ExpansionApproved]. The Council permitted Maple Grove to add over 1000
acres to the metropolitan sewer service area. Id. Furthermore, the Council
budgeted tens of millions of dollars for a new sewer interceptor that would
accommodate even more growth in Maple Grove and other nearby cities.
Metro Council OKs Elm Creek Sewer Plan, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Dec. 17,
1994, at 2B.
21. Council Stumbles, supra note 18, at 16A. At the Council's public
hearing about the agreement, over 200 people, many of low income, showed up
to protest its terms. Mike Kaszuba, Met Council Chair'sAffordable Housing
Agenda FacesFirstTest, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 28, 1995, at lB.
22. ExpansionApproved, supra note 20, at 7B.
23. Kaszuba, supra note 2, at 7B. The agreement sets targets for rental
and owner-occupied housing through the next 16 years, heavily emphasizing
the latter: 630 new rental units affordable to a family earning over $25,000 a
year, and 3,726 owner-occupied units affordable to a family earning over
$41,000. Kaszuba, supra note 21, at lB.
24. See, e.g., Timothy Egan, Becoming Los Angeles: Urban Sprawl Strains
Western States, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1996, at Al ("[Urban growth] was not
supposed to be this way, this early."). One commentator argues that
"unexpected growth-related dilemmas... threaten the long-run viability of
American society, something the American public and most leaders have yet
to realize." ANTHONY DowNs, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA 3
(1994). See generally JAMES HOwARD KUNSTLER, GEOGRAPHY OF NOWHERE
(1993) (observing the overwhelming cultural damage caused by urban sprawl
in America).
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I. HISTORY OF LAND REGULATION

A. THE BIRTH OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION
Land regulation springs from a basic social tension: the use
of private property frequently conflicts with the interests of
those who do not own the property.2 5 Until the end of the nineteenth century, the government largely stayed out of these conflicts.2 6 Private citizens could obtain judicial relief by bringing a

nuisance action 27 or by claiming a breach of restrictive covenant. 8
Eventually, however, when populations of urban industrial centers rapidly concentrated, government efforts to control land
began to develop. Initially, local governments narrowly asserted their police power through the mechanism of building
ordinances.2 9 After the First World War, zoning quickly became the dominant mode of municipal land control.3 0 In 1926,

the Department of Commerce promulgated the Standard State
Zoning Enabling Act, 31 providing the model that guided almost

every state legislature to delegate zoning power to local gov32
ernmental entities.

25. ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 1.02 (2d ed.
1976).
26. Id. § 3.03.
27. Id. Nuisances are uses of private property that are extremely incompatible with the surrounding land. Id.
28. Id. § 3.04. Such covenants restricted the owner of a parcel of land
from using the land in certain ways. This device allowed developers to guarantee interested purchasers of property that neighboring land would not be
put to undesirable use. Id.
29. Id. § 3.06.
30. MEL SCOTT, AMERICAN CITY PLANNING SINCE 1890, at 168-69 (1969).
Although many doubted the validity of zoning because of the Takings Clause,
the Supreme Court soon upheld the constitutionality of zoning ordinances.
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926).
31. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT
UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS (1926)
[hereinafter SZEA], reprinted in DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LAND USE 34-37 (1994).
32. ANDERSON, supra note 25, § 2.21. The Act derived its legal authority
from the doctrine of local police power. Local governments could zone for "the
purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the
community." SZEA, supra note 31, at 34. This emphasis on the local police
power meant the delegation of zoning within each state to the most localized,
rather than to the most expansive, governmental entity. ANDERSON, supra
note 25, § 2.29. The success of the Act as a model for virtually every state effectively meant that each state zoning regime had been defined by a fragmentation of power. Id.
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B. PROBLEMS WITH LOCAL LAND REGULATION
State zoning enabling acts empowered local governmental
entities to shape development within their jurisdictions.3 3 As a
model of land control, however, zoning inadequately addressed
the new land-use problems that emerged after World War II,
when both people and industry began migrating in vast numbers to the suburbs.34 The explosive post-war business and
population growth posed logistical challenges that the insular
land control approach of zoning simply could not meet.35 Because only local governments have the power to zone, 36 attempts to address the larger problems of growth were fragmented and uncoordinated. 37 Furthermore, to the extent that
zoning influenced the geographical course of post-war suburbanization in America, it had a demonstrably detrimental effect on rational urban growth. 3 By emphasizing low-density
development39 and a wide separation of uses, suburban zoning

33. See J.F. Garner & D.L. Callies, PlanningLaw in England and Wales
and in the United States, 1 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 292, 306-08 (1972) (describing
the conventional zoning ordinance). Typically, a zoning ordinance divides a
municipality into sharply separated use districts of three general categories:
residential, commercial, and industrial. Id.
34. See ROBERT FISHMAN, BOURGEOIs UTOPIAS: THE RISE AND FALL OF
SUBURBIA 182 (1987) (describing post-war America as the "Age of Great Suburbs"). Between 1950 and 1970, while cities increased in population by 10
million, suburbs grew by 85 million people. Id. By 1970, more Americans
lived in suburbs than in inner cities. Id. Many commentators point to the
massive federal investments in highway construction and the federal mortgaging practices, which favored new-home building, as major causes of the
exodus to the suburbs. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON,
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS
44, 52-55 (1993) (discussing the effect of these public programs).
35. Robert H. Freilich & John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Timing and Sequential

Controls-The EssentialBasis for Effective Regional Planning:An Analysis of
the New Directionsfor Land Use Control in the Minneapolis-St. Paul Metro-

politanRegion, 58 MiNN. L. REV. 1009, 1011-13 (1974).
36. See supra note 32 (explaining how state enabling statutes delegate
zoning to local governments under the auspices of local police power).

37. Freilich & Ragsdale, supra note 35, at 1013.
38. See JONATHAN BARNETT, THE FRACTURED METROPOLIS 47-52 (1995)
(describing the unintended consequences of zoning on urban environments).
39. See Lawrence 0. Houstoun, Jr., Market Trends Reveal Housing
Choices for the 1980s, in LAND USE ISSUES OF THE 1980S 30, 30 (James H.

Carr & Edward E. Duensing eds., 1983) (analyzing the changing housing preferences of Americans since the 1950s). Between 1950 and 1970, urban densities in America "dropped like a rock" from five persons per acre to two and a
half. Id.
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rejected schemes of compact, integrated development and encouraged sprawling development.4 0
The effect of suburban expansion on infrastructure, taxes,
and the environment became increasingly apparent in the 1960s
and 1970s.41 High demand, low land costs, and the absence of
developmental oversight by local governments encouraged developers to build at the periphery of cities.42 While the real estate market flourished, however, many of the costs of growth actually fell on the public sector. Private development quickly
outpaced infrastructure, so that many suburban communities
received inadequate water, sewage, and utility service.43 The
scattered placement of homes, jobs, and schools made suburban
residents dependent on the automobile, yet the new highways
and ad hoc secondary roads could not handle the traffic created
by the sprawling development." Moreover, diffusion of residential and industrial development caused mass transit to become
45
an increasingly nonviable solution to the congestion problem.
Rapid and thoughtless consumption of open space caused extensive damage to the natural environment.46 It also made the urban environment increasingly ugly.47 Finally, facing vast new

40. See BARNETT, supra note 38, at 47-48. Suburban zoning is in fact an
"artifact," projecting a "1920s real estate pattern," designed for high-density
urban environment, onto a completely different landscape than it was intended to regulate. Id. When the lots are thousands of acres in size, lot-by-lot
zoning is "the recipe for urban sprawl." Id. at 48.
41. Id. at 34-42.
42. See Freilich & Ragsdale, supranote 35, at 1013 (calling for a "comprehensive approach," including "sufficient regional power," to implement changes
necessary to correct the problems associated with suburban growth).
43. Id.
44. See American Planning Association, Solving Traffic Woes by Balancing Jobs and Housing, in BALANCED GROWTH 42 (John DeGrove ed., 1991)
(identifying the spatial mismatch between workplace and residence as the
major cause of rush-hour congestion).
45. See DOWNS, supra note 24, at 8 (explaining the transportation problem).
46. Freilich & Ragsdale, supra note 35, at 1013. But cf BARNETT, supra
note 38, at 47 (criticizing the delay between societal changes and corresponding
changes in zoning). "It takes years of meticulous engineering and months of
public hearings and approvals before a hillside can be bulldozed into a parking
lot...." Id.
47. "We drive up and down the gruesome, tragic suburban boulevards of
commerce, and we're overwhelmed at the fantastic, awesome, stupefying ugliness of absolutely everything in sight." James Howard Kunstler, Home from
Nowhere, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1996, at 43.
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infrastructural needs, local governments imposed soaring property tax rates. 8
C. RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEMS-COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING
For many suburbanites, the quality-of-life problems that
caused them to settle outside cities were now reoccurring in
their new neighborhoods. 49 For politicians at both the local
and state level, the urban sprawl phenomenon became more
than an infrastructural, fiscal, or environmental problem-it
became a political problem. 0 Confronted with inefficient, chaotic growth, many local governments developed comprehensive
land-use plans. 1 Previously, municipalities had largely confined their efforts to creating zoning codes, which simplistically
connect use and land.5 2 In contrast, comprehensive plans anticipate a dynamic range of developmental possibilities. 3 By
integrating land-use control with other issues of governance,
comprehensive planning provides an efficient and legal 4
method for municipalities to coordinate their needs and resources.
Despite the advantages of comprehensive land planning, the
planning power remained local, thereby curtailing the "compre-

48. Freilich & Ragsdale, supra note 35, at 1013.
49. See BARNETT, supra note 38, at 4-7 (describing nuisances residents
experience as their suburbs become more urbanized); see also ARTHUR
NAFTALIN, MAKING ONE COmmuNITY OUT OF MANY 14-16 (1986) (discussing
how these concerns mounted in the Twin Cities area during the 1960s).
50. See NAFTALIN, supra note 49, at 17-18 (describing various political
issues and legislative responses connected with urban sprawl).
51. Perhaps most notably, California passed a law requiring each local
government to adopt a comprehensive plan. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65300 (West
1986).
52. SZEA provided that zoning must be "in accordance with a comprehensive plan," SZEA, supra note 31, at 34, but most local governments and
state courts circumvented this requirement. See, e.g., Kozesnik v. Township
of Montgomery, 131 A.2d 1, 8 (N.J. 1957) (noting that "[a] plan may readily be
revealed in an end-product-here the zoning ordinance-and no more is required by statute").
53. See Charles M. Haar, The Master Plan:AnImpermanent Constitution,
20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 353, 354-61 (1955) (outlining the concepts behind
comprehensive plans). In these plans, municipalities may consider local land
use as it relates to issues such as public finance, public works capacity, economic development, and population change. Id.
54. See, e.g., Golden v. Planning Bd. of the Town of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d
291, 304-05 (N.Y. 1972) (upholding a town's comprehensive plan to coordinate
development with the expansion of infrastructure capacity).
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hensiveness" of land-use control.5 5 Familiar structural problems remained. The jurisdictional limitations of the political
body that implemented each plan limited the reach of the plan
itself.56 Comprehensive plans expanded a municipality's local
land-control powers, ultimately giving local governments greater
57
power to exclude undesirable classes of people or activities.
Such efforts are undeniably rational from the perspective of the
regulating municipality, 58 but when a municipality successfully
shifts costs, other communities in the region almost always
bear them.5 9 As each municipality took the same "beggar-thyneighbor" approach, significant costs accumulated for which no
one took responsibility.

55. See Houstoun, supra note 39, at 35 (pointing out the logistical difficulties of coordinating planning in a country with 80,000 governmental entities).
56. See supra text accompanying note 37 (noting the inevitable tension
between the land control efforts of neighboring municipalities).
57. See RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME: MUNICIPAL PRACTICES
AND POLICIES 3 (1966) (arguing that local planning provides a tool for
"protecting the homogenous, single family suburb from the city"). In the early
1990s, HUD Secretary Jack Kemp commissioned a study to examine official
barriers to affordable housing in America. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING, "NOT IN MY BACK YARD":
REMOVING BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING 1 (1991). The study found a

number of land-use mechanisms that turn suburban communities into
"homogenous enclaves." Id. at 4-5. Comprehensive plans often contain strict
growth control, thereby limiting the number of outsiders who can enter the
community. Id. at 3-4. Factors including large lot sizes, single-family home
requirements, and excessive development fees effectively screen out all but
the privileged. Id. at 4-7.
58. See DOWNS, supra note 24, at 3-4 (describing the economic reasons
local jurisdictions strive to control the pace and direction of their growth).
59. See id. at 41 (stating that a successful attempt to limit growth in one
suburb merely shifts the problem to another). The result has been a modern
"tragedy of the commons." See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons,
162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968) (declaring that "[r]uin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that
believes in the freedom of the commons").
60. See DOWNS, supra note 24, at 41. Of course, these "costs" involve
more than just dollar amounts. A recent Twin Cities study shows how remarkably inefficient public investment in the developing suburbs is compared
to public investment in the core cities and inner-ring suburbs. See Lyle Wray,
Sprawl Steals More Than Urban Residents; It Undermines Business and Regional Health, FEDGAZETTE, Jan. 1996, at 14, 15 (declaring that unrestrained
growth and investment in suburban areas are only wise business decisions "in
a very narrow, short-term context"). Investment in the private-sector of developed cities returned two-and-a-half times more than investment in the
outer-ring suburbs. Id.
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H. STATE AND REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE LAND-USE
PLANS-INTEGRATION OF CONTROL
A. THE QUIET REVOLUTION
Perhaps encouraged by federal efforts to promote regional
planning, 61 many states enacted statutes that shifted comprehensive land planning responsibility from local government to
state or regional entities.62 This attempt to integrate land control power at a broad jurisdictional level, known as the "Quiet
Revolution,"6 took place nationally in two waves during the
1970s and 1980s.64 Generally, the state statutes of the Quiet
61. The federal government's most direct endorsement of regional urban
planning came when it delegated review of certain federal grant applications
to state-derived regional agencies. See Lassar, supra note 12, at 23 (noting
that the 1976 Metropolitan Significance Act granted to the Met Council the
power to "delay approval of projects deemed to be of metropolitan significance").
62. John M. DeGrove & Patricia M. Metzger, Growth Management and
the IntegratedRole of State, Regional, and Local Governments, in GROWTH
MANAGEMENT: THE PLANNING CHALLENGE OF THE 1990S 3, 4 (Jay M. Stein
ed., 1993).
63. See FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN

LAND USE CONTROL 1 (1972) (announcing the beginning of the end of "the
feudal system" under which parochial governments control land development).
64. See DeGrove & Metzger, supra note 62, at 5 (describing differences in
the growth management systems in the 1970s as compared to those of the
1980s and 1990s). In, fact, when massive development threatened Hawaii's
island beauty, Hawaii pioneered the state land-use system in 1961, a decade
before other "first wave" regimes. See JOHN DEGROVE, LAND, GROWTH, AND
POLITICS 9-11 (1984). Vermont, Florida, Colorado, and Oregon followed suit
in the early 1970s. See generally id. (documenting the genesis and implementation of these and other statewide plans). These first-wave states, each endowed with natural resources, shared a common concern: the deleterious impact
of growth on the environment. See John DeGrove, Growth Management and
Governance, in UNDERSTANDING GROWTH MANAGEMENT: CRITICAL ISSUES AND
A RESEARCH AGENDA 22, 23 (David J. Brower et al. eds., 1989).
The second wave began in the mid-1980s. A number of legislatures
started to enact or study statewide plans. See generally JOHN DEGROVE, THE
NEW FRONTIER FOR LAND POLICY: PLANNING AND GROWTH MANAGEMENT IN
THE STATES (1992) (analyzing this new generation of state land planning
schemes). Behind this new generation of plans lay broader "quality of life"
concerns including issues of environment, infrastructure, and particularly
transportation and affordable housing. DeGrove, Growth Management and
Governance, in UNDERSTANDING GROWTH MANAGEMENT: CRITICAL ISSUES
AND A RESEARCH AGENDA, supra, at 32.
For example, New Jersey enacted both planning and fair housing laws.
N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:18A-196 to -208 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996); N.J.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996). They were
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Revolution create new agencies authorized to develop statewide or regional planning policies." These agencies have the
power to implement planning policies, usually by reviewing local plans for their conformity to the state or regional policies. 6
Different statutory regimes provide the agencies with varying
enforcement mechanisms to use 67against recalcitrant municipalities, but all allow court action.
B. OREGON'S PROGRAM-A MODEL OF SUCCESS
Oregon's comprehensive land-use planning program68 has
been credited with more success than any other's, 69 causing

passed in the aftermath of the landmark Mount Laurel cases, in which the
New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated municipal zoning standards that excluded affordable housing. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township
of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 734 (N.J. 1975) (Mt. Laurel 1); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 415 (N.J.
1983) (Mt. Laurel I). For an examination of these decisions and their impact
on state growth management, see Peter A. Buchsbaum, No Wrong Without
Remedy: The New Jersey Supreme Court's Effort to Bar Exclusionary Zoning,
in GROWTH MANAGEMENT: KEEPING ON TARGET? 193, 193-213 (Douglas R.
Porter ed., 1986). In Mount Laurel II, the court tried to fix the official evasion
of Mt. Laurel I by creating a "builder's remedy," whereby a builder who successfully challenges a municipality's zoning ordinance obtains the right to
build her project. 456 A.2d at 452-53. This remedy gives private developers
"the whip hand" in dealing with municipalities not complying with the inclusionary zoning standards developed in Mt. Laurel IL Buchsbaum, supra, at
205.
65. See DeGrove & Metzger, supra note 62, at 9-15 (outlining the second
wave of state comprehensive planning programs).
66. See id. at 10-11 (describing the purpose for a state's review agency).
67. See id. at 7-15 (illustrating different state approaches).
68. See Robert L. Liberty, Oregon's Comprehensive Growth Management
Program:An Implementation Review and Lessons for Other States, 22 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10,367, 10,368-73 (1992) (giving an overview of Oregon's land-use
planning system). The Land Conservation and Development Commission
(LCDO) oversees the program. OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 197.030 (Butterworth
1991 & Supp. 1996). The LCDC adopted 14 statewide planning goals in 1974
after considering a legislatively derived list of topics and conducting open
hearings around the state. Liberty, supra, at 10,369. "Citizen involvement"
became the first goal, followed by specific environmental and urban land-use
goals. Id. at 10,369 n.17. All cities and counties in Oregon were then required
to formulate comprehensive land-use plans consistent with the goals. § 197.175.
After the local governments adopted comprehensive plans, they submitted
them to the LCDC for "acknowledgment" and then the LCDC approved or
denied their implementation. §§ 197.040(2)(d), .251(1)-(2), .251(4)-(6).
69. See 5 NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN
PLANNING LAW § 160.16 (1985) (calling the Oregon planning law "by far the
most advanced in the country"); see also DeGrove & Metzger, supra note 62,
at 7 (praising Oregon's success at controlling urban sprawl).
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many of the second-wave states to model their plans after it.7"
Its success springs primarily from procedural mechanisms that
allow private citizens expansive opportunity to appeal state
and local land-use planning decisions in Oregon courts. 7 1 In
1973, the same year the initial planning statute was introduced, the Oregon Supreme Court handed down a landmark
decision, Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners of Washington County,72 which by itself changed the legal landscape in
Oregon. 3 Finding that comprehensive plans supersede zoning
criteria,74 the Fasano court held that zoning decisions are
quasi-judicial in nature, and therefore no longer entitled to
presumptive validity. 5 Fasano shifted the evidentiary burden
in land-use hearings and appeals, requiring the local entity to
76
justify its land-use decisions against its comprehensive plan.
Furthermore, Fasano established land-use hearing requirements to facilitate public participation and appellate review."
70. See DeGrove & Metzger, supra note 62, at 6-10 (describing Oregon's
pioneering approaches, which were later used by other states). Minnesota has
also looked toward Oregon when contemplating a statewide land planning
statute. Sprawl Control: Oregon Law Might Work for Minnesota Too, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis), Mar. 5, 1994, at 14A.
71. See Liberty, supra note 68, at 10,388 (suggesting, based on Oregon's
experience, that "private enforcement may be the only effective way to enforce
land use laws").
72. 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973) (en banc).
73. MITCH ROHsE, LAND-USE PLANNING IN OREGON: A No-NONSENsE
HANDBOOK IN PLAIN ENGLISH 100

(1987).

74. See id. at 99 (explaining Fasano'sholding that zone changes must conform to comprehensive plans). The court made this determination through its
construction of Oregon's zoning enabling statute. Fasano,507 P.2d at 27-28.
75. Fasano, 507 P.2d at 28. The majority of state courts consider zoning
decisions to be legislative and use a substantive due process analysis when
reviewing zoning decisions. Under this rational basis standard, these courts
rarely invalidate zoning decisions. See Edward J. Sullivan, The Legal Evolution of the Oregon Planning System, in PLANNING THE OREGON WAY: A
TWENTY-YIEAR EVALUATION 49, 51 (Carl Abbott et al. eds., 1994); see infra note
105 (summarizing Minnesota's zoning doctrine, which follows the majority of
states).
76. Fasano, 507 P.2d at 28. Local comprehensive plans in Oregon helped
to ensure that established local planning policies were no longer vulnerable to
radical deviations in ad hoc zoning proceedings. Sullivan, supra note 75, at
51.
77. Fasano, 507 P.2d at 30. The court stated that parties are entitled to
trial-like procedures, which serve to preserve the record for appeal. Id. Because of the subsequent increase in private access to the courts, Oregon's legislature created a specialized land court in 1979. The Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) reviews all city, county, or regional land-use decisions that have
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Oregon courts have also broadly construed standing, so that
any party who participated in the local proceeding-including
concerned citizens, developers, and nonprofit organizationsmay appeal an adverse decision. 78 In Oregon, private parties
can now use the courts to enforce the sweeping sprawl control
policy developed by the state legislature.7 9 Practically speaking, the procedural features of Oregon's land-use planning law,
derived from statute and case law, have added a citizen's suit
provision' to the state's growth management program.
C. MINNESOTA'S PROGRAM
Structurally, Minnesota's regional land-use program strongly
resembles Oregon's program.81 In 1967, Minnesota's legislature created the Metropolitan Council to administer "a combeen properly appealed. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.805-.860 (Butterworth
1991 & Supp. 1996) (establishing LUBA).
78. See Jefferson Landfill Comm. v. Marion County, 686 P.2d 310, 313
(Or. 1984) (en banc) (establishing broad test for standing); see also Liberty,
supra note 68, at 10,373-74 (outlining the expansion of standing in courts). In
1989, Oregon's legislature followed the courts' lead, explicitly endorsing a
broad notion of standing. Id.
79. Liberty, supra note 68, at 10,389. 1000 Friends of Oregon, a nonprofit
legal organization, played a pivotal role in the success of the Oregon program
by engaging in early litigation that defined and enforced the statewide plan.
See id. at 10,390 (documenting the influence of litigation brought by the
group).
80. At a time when politics and finances restrain agency enforcement,
many argue citizen enforcement must fill the enforcement gap. See, e.g.,
JOSEPH SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR ACTION 53,
108-13 (1971) (providing an account of the advantages citizen litigation offers
compared to agency enforcement). Private actions also help motivate agencies
to exercise their own enforcement power more diligently. Wilder v. Thomas,
854 F.2d 605, 613 (2d Cir. 1988). One commentator recently argued that citizen enforcement legitimizes policymaking by providing a public avenue into
the administrative decision-making process. Adam Babich, Citizen Suits: The
Teeth in Public Participation,25 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,141, 10,141 (1995). n
fact, citizen suit provisions have become common in environmental statutes.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994) (allowing "any person" to sue air polluters
under the Clean Air Act). Courts have continually upheld the legality and
wisdom of such provisions. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d
165, 172 (2d Cir. 1976) (stating that citizen plaintiffs "are not to be treated as
nuisances or troublemakers but rather as welcomed participants").
81. Both programs delegate strong policymaking and enforcement powers
to a central agency, which in turn creates broad plans to which local plans
must conform. See supra note 68 (describing the structure of Oregon's landuse planning system). Although Oregon's plan is statewide in scope, Oregon's
legislature also created a metropolitan council for Portland in the 1970s to coordinate planning in the state's largest metropolitan area. Charles C. Whiting, Portland'sElected Met Council Gives Twin Cities a Taste of What Could
Be, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 16, 1994, at 13A.
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prehensive development guide for the metropolitan region."8 2
A constellation of problems related to sprawling, low-density
growth motivated the legislature to act.83 The statute required
the Council to prepare and adopt a Metropolitan Development
Guide for the seven-county Twin Cities area.84 During several
years of studies and public hearings 85 the Council developed
the Guide, which became a collection of policy statements,
goals, and maps addressing the present and projected needs of
86
the region.
In 1976, the state legislature delegated to the Council the
power to implement its plans in the Metropolitan Land Planning Act,87 which the media termed a "controversial antisprawl
bill."88 The Act pronounced the legislature's findings that the
fate of each community is intertwined with others in the region, and that rapid regional growth poses a number of 89danIt
gers which must be addressed in a coordinated manner.

82.

MINN. STAT. § 473.145 (1996).

83. See NAFTALIN, supra note 49, at 15-16. "The flat land radiating from
the Twin Cities invited low-density development.... [Miost builders, homeowners and municipal officials were caught up in the expansion fever and
seemed oblivious to the problems of rapid and uncoordinated development."
Id. Simultaneously, the "suburban explosion" and its emphasis on the automobile taxed the highway system and threatened to doom mass transit. Id.
84.

MINN. STAT. § 473.145.

85. See Brian W. Ohm, Growth Management in Minnesota:The Metropolitan Land PlanningAct, 16 HAMLINE L. REv. 359, 375 (1993) (discussing the
Council's early work).
86.

MINN. STAT. § 473.145.

87. 1976 Minn. Laws ch. 127 (now codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 473.175,
473.851 (1996)).
88. Aron Kahn, Antisprawl Plan Passes Senate, PIONEER PRESS (St.
Paul), Mar. 2, 1976, at 1. The bill passed by only two votes in both the House
and the Senate. Aron Kahn, Sprawl Curbs Passed,PIONEER PRESS (St. Paul),
Mar. 26, 1976, at 7.
89. The findings portion of the preamble declares that "the local governmental units within the metropolitan area are interdependent." MINN. STAT.
§ 473.851 (1996). It continues:
Since problems of urbanization and development transcend local governmental boundaries, there is need for the adoption of coordinated
plans, programs and controls by all local governmental units... to
protect the health, safety and welfare of the residents of the metropolitan area and to ensure coordinated, orderly and economic development.
Id.
Representative Berg, one of the bill's sponsors, introduced it on the House
floor with the observation that "we are eating up land at a... tremendous
rate." Audio Tape of the Minnesota Legislature's House Debate on H.F. 1530
(Feb. 3, 1976) (on file at Minnesota History Center) [hereinafter House De-
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then stated two broad purposes. One stressed a commanding
role for the Council to "establish requirements and procedures
to accomplish comprehensive local planning with land-use controls consistent with planned, orderly and staged development."90 The second emphasized cooperation: "to provide assisunits... for the preparation of
tance to local governmental
91
plans and controls."
The Act mandates that all local governments in the metropolitan area provide comprehensive plans 92 within the framework of "metropolitan system plans" that the Council derived
from the Metropolitan Development Guide. 93 Like Oregon's
state planning agency, the Council then must review various
local plans to measure their compatibility with the Council's
metropolitan system plan.94 If the local plan has a "substantial
impact on or contain[s] a substantial departurefrom" the syslocal governmental
tem plan,95 the Council "may require 9 a
6
unit" to make appropriate modifications.
If the Council approves the local plan, then the municipality must adopt zoning controls consistent with the comprehensive plan.97 This provision is the result of much post-enactment
wrangling. The requirement that local zoning controls conform
with comprehensive plans reflected the original intent of the
Act to require that local governments use zoning to carry out
the policies of their comprehensive plans.9" In 1985, however,
the legislature amended the Act to provide that zoning ordinances should supersede comprehensive plans when the two
are in conflict. 99 Finally, in 1995, the legislature reversed this
priority: "If the comprehensive municipal plan is in conflict
with the zoning ordinance, the zoning ordinance shall be

bate]. After charting the effect of the sprawl, he declared the bill a
"significant advancement in land use planning." Id.
90. MINN.STAT. § 473.851.

91. Id.
92. Id. Comprehensive plans must include, among other things, a landuse plan and a public-facilities plan. Id. § 473.859.
93. Id. § 473.851.
94. Id. § 473.175.
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. Id.
97. Id. § 473.858.
98. METROPOLITAN COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 74.
99. See 1985 Minn. Laws ch. 62, § 4 (favoring zoning over the comprehensive plan).
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brought into
conformance with the plan by local government
0
10o
units ....
Unlike the Oregon program, the Council's implementation
10 1
of the Minnesota program never faced a legal challenge.
Moreover, the Act has not played a significant role in private
0 2 The absence
land-use litigation."
of such private challenges is
no mystery. The Act only vaguely provides for any party other
than the Council or local governmental entities to participate
in the process.103 Until now, Minnesota has simply lacked the
official encouragement 0 4 and favorable case law 5 that makes
private litigation such an important part of the Oregon system.
If Minnesota courts are to allow private enforcement of the Act
as it now stands, they will have to imply a private right of action, something they generally resist.10 6
100. MINN. STAT. § 473.858.
101. The Act provides for local government appeals at two points in the
process: when the Council first submits a system statement to a jurisdiction,
and when the Council requires a modification of a comprehensive plan because it substantially impacts or departs from a system statement. Id.
§§ 473.857, 473.866. The municipality must first appeal to an "advisory metropolitan land use committee." Id. § 473.853. Only after the aggrieved government has exhausted this route may it appeal to an administrative law
judge, and then to a state appellate court. Id. §§ 473.857, 473.866. No appeal
has gone to court thus far.
102. The Act is only cited in three Minnesota cases and does not play an
important role in any of them.
103. If a local government decides to challenge the contents of the Council's system plan to which it must substantially conform, the Act allows "all
interested persons" to participate in the subsequent hearing. MiNN. STAT.
§ 473.857. Only the local government, however, may appeal in the first place.
104. See supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text (describing how Oregon's land planning agency prioritized "citizen involvement," and how its legislature endorsed broad private standing).
105. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text (explaining the role
Fasano played in opening up Oregon courts to local land-use challenges).
Contrary to Fasano, Minnesota courts have long held that zoning trumps
planning. They follow the majority of states in viewing local land-use decisions as legislative rather than judicial. See State ex rel. Rochester Ass'n of
Neighborhoods v. City of Rochester, 268 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Minn. 1978)
(holding that "[w]hen municipality adopts or amends a zoning ordinance, it
acts in a legislative capacity under its delegated police powers... [and] a
zoning or rezoning classification must be upheld unless opponents prove that
the classification is unsupported by any rational basis"). In Minnesota's
scheme, the comprehensive plan is "generally viewed as advisory." Amcon
Corp. v. City of Eagan, 348 N.W.2d 66, 74 (Minn. 1984).
106. The Minnesota Supreme Court hesitates to imply private rights of
action. Hoppe ex rel. Dykema v. Kandiyohi County, 543 N.W.2d 635, 638
(Minn. 1996); see also Bruegger v. Faribanlt County Sheriffs Dep't, 497
N.W.2d 260, 262 (Minn. 1993) (explaining that principles of judicial restraint
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III. THE METROPOLITAN LAND PLANNING ACTS
FAILED PROMISE
A. MINNESOTA'S PLAN HAS BARELY ABATED SPRAWL
Any superficial resemblance between the comprehensive
planning programs of Oregon and Minnesota breaks down
when comparing their relative effectiveness at controlling urban sprawl. Urban sprawl in Portland has remained virtually
static over the last twenty years. 107 Over a five-year period in
the 1980s, the growth boundary around Portland expanded by
only 2,515 acres.105 By contrast, during a five-year period in
Minnesota, the Council amended its Metropolitan Urban
Services Area (MUSA)1"9 to add over 18,000 new acres,110 even
though the metropolitan region remained one of the least
densely populated in the country.111 Portland's population
density has risen dramatically while the Twin Cities' density
has continued to plummet.'12 The Council recently approved a
plan to phase in over 200,000 acres to MUSA starting in the
year 2000. This will vastly increase the amount of developable

limit the implication of statutory rights). The court, however, has not foreclosed the possibility. See Counties of Blue Earth v. Minnesota Dept. of Labor
and Indus., 489 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 78 (1975)).
107. Similar growth dynamics are at work in Portland and the Twin Cities.
Both areas expect population growths of 650,000 in the next 25 years. Lynda
McDonnell, The Sprawl Stops Here, PIONEER PRESS (St. Paul), Nov. 22, 1996,
at 1A. Both have strong economies and are highly rated as places to live. Id.
108. Sprawl Control: Oregon Law Might Work for Minnesota Too, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis), Mar. 5, 1994, at 14A [hereinafter Sprawl Control].
109. In creating MUSA, the Council mapped out a line across which urban
services could not extend, thereby creating great disincentives to develop
outside the boundary. Lassar, supra note 12, at 21.
110. Sprawl Control, supra note 108, at 14A. The Council drew the MUSA
line quite generously in the first place. Lassar, supranote 12, at 21.
111. See Dane Smith, Legislature to Get Proposals to Mend Disparities,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Dec. 11, 1992, at 26A (stating that the Twin Cities
region is "second only to Kansas City" in terms of low density among the 25
most populated metropolitan regions). Even a Council member admits the
densities in the area are "unreal." Mike Kaszuba, Met Council'sNew Strategy:
A Slow Stretch, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 3, 1996, at lB.
112. See McDonnell, supra note 107, at 1A ("The average new suburban lot
is 7,500 square feet in Portland, while 20,000-square-foot lots are standard in
developing [Twin Cities] suburbs."). Defying dire predictions, Portland's era
of growth control has ushered in jobs, higher home values, and, indeed, more
people. Timothy Egan, Drawing the Hard Line Against Urban Sprawl, N.Y.
TIms, Dec. 30, 1996, at Al.
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land in the metropolitan region. 113 The Council claims that it
will focus anew on achieving progress in policy areas like affordable housing as it decides how to direct development in this
vast new supply of land. 114 However, the Council's persistent
reputation as "an easy mark" for developers and suburbs," 5
reinforced by its recent performance in Maple Grove," 6 raises
sincere doubts about the likelihood of it achieving these goals.

B. AN UNSUCCESSFUL DELEGATION: AMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE,
AMBIVALENT AGENCY

Two central elements of the Act have contributed to the
failure of its promise: the ambiguity of the statutory enabling
language, and the delegation of metropolitan land planning
authority to the Council. Given the authority to interpret its
powers, the Council has adopted a conservative interpretation
of the statutory enabling language, failing to enforce its own
plans.
1. Fuzzy Language and Mixed Legislative Motives
Although sponsors of the Act promoted it as an essential
mechanism to protect the integrity of metropolitan systems," 7
the statute remained oddly unassertive. The Act sends mixed
signals in its stated purpose. A strong mandate to control
growth is immediately mitigated by an admonition to assist
municipalities in their planning."'
This tension between
command and cooperation in the statutory text also appeared
in the House debate, where floor sponsors alternately defended
and downplayed the Council's enforcement power." 9
113. Metro Growth: What Counts Is on the Ground, Not the Map, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 9, 1996, at 18A [hereinafter Metro Growth]. Compare how Oregon's history of growth restriction has altered the discourse in
Portland: "While Portland's Metro Council debates whether 18,000 acres is too
much land to hold 650,000 new people, the Twin Cities' Metropolitan Council
wonders if 130,000 acres is too little for the same number." McDonnell, supra
note 107, at 1A.
114. See METROPOLITAN CouNcIL, supra note 2, at 46-48 (stating the
Council's goal to expand housing opportunities in the region).
115. Sprawl Control, supra note 108, at 14A.
116. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text (describing the Council's conservative approach toward confronting Maple Grove's policy of exclusionary zoning).
117. House Debate, supra note 89 (comments of Rep. Casserly).
118. MINN. STAT. § 473.851 (1996).
119. Representative Casserly, the bill's floor manager, explained that it
was "absolutely essential that we allow the Council to protect these systems."
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The language of the Act empowering the Council to enforce
its metropolitan policies suffers from several ambiguities.
First, the Act does not clearly define "metropolitan system
plans," the fulcrum of the Council's planning power. The statute defines them as "the policy plans" for metropolitan sewers,
transportation, open space, and airports. 120 At first glance, this
might seem to restrict the system plans to matters dealing
specifically with the four major infrastructural systems. Another statutory provision requires, however, that any specific
policy plan "must substantially conform" to all the other
Council policies. 12 1 Under this definition, system plans might
take into account, for example, the Council's housing policy
plans.12 Although the Council could conceivably adopt a broad
reading of "system plan," it currently construes its authority as
limited only to local123plans that directly impact the four infrastructural systems.
A second ambiguity stems from the question of what constitutes a "substantial impact on" or "substantial departure
from" a system plan, triggering the Council's authority to require modification. 124 This definitional problem is not clarified
by the statutory language. In practice, the Council currently
interprets the term "substantial" very narrowly, curtailing the
situations in which it can exercise its power. 125 The Council
will 1look
only to whether a local plan threatens "system capacity." 26 The statutory language, however, does not require such
a limited interpretation. The term "substantial" has powerful
pro-discretionary connotations in the context of an agency's exercise of its delegated power. 127 Its use in defining the scope of
House Debate, supra note 89. However, Casserly also several times assured
wary legislators that the Council's main task is to "supply information," and
that the review for consistency would not be "an adversary procedure." Id.
120. MINN. STAT. § 473.852.
121. Id. § 473.146, subd. 1; see supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text

(describing the goals of the Metropolitan Development Guide).
122. Brian Ohm, who worked on the legal staff of the Council in the 1980s,
endorses this expansive interpretation of the statute. See Ohm, supra note
85, at 379-80.
123.

OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE

AUDITOR,

STATE

OF MINNESOTA,

METROPOLITAN COUNCIL 27 (1985) [hereinafter AUDITOR'S REPORT].
124. MINN. STAT. § 473.175.
125. Ohm, supra note 85, at 381-82.
126. Id.
127. Under Minnesota's Administrative Procedure Act (APA) the term

"substantial" signals that the legislature means to unfetter agency discretion,
not restrict it. For example, the APA's "substantial evidence" standard, MINN.
STAT. § 14.69(e) (1996), entitles an agency's exercise of judgment to a signifi-
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agency discretion sends a cautionary message to courts that
would second-guess the Council's assertion of its power. Unfortunately, rather than reading the phrase as a liberating one,
the Council chooses to interpret it prohibitively.
A final problem with the Act is that it delegates enforcement decisions entirely to the Council. The legislature's word
choice-that the Council "may require a local government unit
to modify" local plans 12 8 -is conspicuously permissive. In the
two preceding sentences, the statutory directive is mandatory,
stating that the Council "shall review" local comprehensive
plans. 129 The most heated discussion during the House floor
debate arose over whether the Council's enforcement power
should be discretionary. One representative attempted to
amend the "may" to "shall," arguing that if the purpose of the
Act was to ensure good planning, the Council should have no
power to1 permit bad planning. 130 Nonetheless, this amendment
13
failed.
The practical result of the Act's unclear directive has been
a restrictive Council interpretation of its own authority: the
Council will consider modifying a municipal comprehensive
plan only if that plan has a direct and radical effect on any of
the four basic infrastructural systems.'3 2 In fact, the Council
so narrowly construes its authority that it has not brought an
enforcement action in court against a municipality in twenty
years.'33 Municipal planners regard the implementation aspects of the Act as a teaching device. 34 This inevitably uncant degree of deference. See, e.g., Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d
808, 825 (Minn. 1977) (stating that substantial evidence is "relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion"). A
correlative principle of the substantial evidence test is that a "court must give
a substantial deference to the fact-finding processes of an administrative
agency." Minnegasco v. Minnesota Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 529 N.W.2d 413, 417
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995), rev'd, 549 N.W.2d 904 (Minn. 1996).
128. MINN. STAT. § 473.175 (emphasis added).
129. Id. (emphasis added).
130. House Debate, supra note 89. Representative Schreiber, a bill sponsor, responded that the permissive language of this "central provision" had
been carefully considered in subcommittee hearings. Id. The language, he
said, was intentionally left "a little bit discretionary." Id. However, Casserly
also assured the lawmakers that the language "didn't make all that much of a
difference." Id.
131. Id.
132. See supra Part HI.A (summarizing the Council's inauspicious sprawl
control record).
133. See supra notes 101-102 (noting the lack of case law on the Act).
134. See AUDITOR's REPORT, supra note 123, at 26.
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dermines the Council's ability to curb the problems associated
with urban sprawl. In fact, the Council's self-imposed requirement of a major trigger mechanism contradicts the rationale of inteijurisdictional planning explicitly voiced in the
Act's finding that "the problems of urbanization and development transcend local government boundaries." Self-interested
local land-use decisions, while not individually crippling to the
region, take a heavy toll when aggregated.135
2. The Metropolitan Council: A Double Agent?
The Council frequently pleads lack of power when controlling land use in the metropolitan region. 136 An honest examination of the Council's poor track record must, however, recognize the Council's lack of will. If the Act leaves a great deal
of wiggle room, the Council ultimately does the wiggling. Although the stated purpose, specific language, and legislative
history of the statute are admittedly ambiguous, the Act establishes a system structure that deprives local municipalities
of any discretion in their interaction with the Council. This
clearly leaves the balance of power in the Council's hands.
Furthermore, the broad purpose of the Act and the delegation
of enforcement power to the Council strongly suggest that the
Council has an affirmative duty to utilize its authority. Unfortunately, the Council has permitted its structural power to atrophy. In the end, the Council has largely abdicated its baseline responsibility.13 7
135. The Council completely overlooks the dynamic behind the "tragedy of
the commons," at the heart of the urban growth problem. See supra notes 5760 and accompanying text (explaining how municipal actors perform this

tragedy).
136. See AUDITOR's REPORT, supra note 123, at 27; see also METROPOLITAN
COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 74-75 (outlining the Council's proposals for
amending the Act to make the Council role more effective).
137. Consider Maple Grove, Minnesota, whose exclusionary zoning practices substantially lowered the density of housing within its borders. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text (detailing the city's exclusionary efforts). Without the city's request to build a new sewer interceptor, there are
strong arguments that these practices directly impact metropolitan systems.
For example, shifting low-income people out of a thriving community increases the spatial mismatch between homes and jobs, a leading cause of traffic congestion. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (noting this phenomenon). With the city's request for a new sewer interceptor, however, the
Council's authority to require the city to modify its land-use practices seems
apparent. Maple Grove's proposal directly impacted sewage system capacity,
thus implicating one of the four major systems. Given even the most favorable circumstances, the Council failed to act.
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Several factors might explain the Council's passivity.
First, the Council suffers from an institutional history marked
by confusion and waning support from the legislature, one that
spent the 1980s in a "decadelong slide toward insignificance."'
The Legislative Auditor found that the Council began aggressively implementing its powers under the Act, but
backed down when it met initial resistance. 139 In the early
1980s, the leadership of the Council began to change frequently, leaving the agency without a clear direction. 140 At the
turn of the decade, many speculated whether the Council had
the legislature discussed abolishing
become obsolete. 4 1 In fact,
42
the Council altogether.
Yet even after a legislative vote of confidence in 1994 that
resulted in the consolidation of all regional power into the
1
Council, 43 special interests may have captured the agency. 4
Over the years, the presence of the real estate development industry on the Council has greatly expanded. This interest
group has the most to lose from tight restrictions on urban
growth. 14 1 Currently, one-third of the Council members have
strong ties to real estate development. 146 Moreover, all sitting
members owe their appointments to Governor Carlson, whose
base of support lies in the developing suburbs of the metropoltan region, the constituency most opposed to controlling
growth. 4 Although in the past the current Council chair was
138. Kaszuba & Blake, supra note 12, at 1A; see also AUDITOR'S
supra note 123, at 29 (noting the major criticisms of the Council).
139.

REPORT,

AUDITOR'S REPORT, supra note 123, at 26.

140. Kaszuba & Blake, supra note 12, at 1A.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See Metropolitan Reorganization Act of 1994, 1994 Minn. Laws ch.
628 (merging all metropolitan administrative powers into the Metropolitan

Council).
144.

See THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND

REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 92-93, 112 (2d ed. 1979) (describing the tendency of the regulators and the regulated to become "part of one big policymaking family").
145. See Mike Kaszuba, A "Delicate Balance" for Met Council Members,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 30, 1996, at 1.
146. Id.
147. Id. A recent episode demonstrates the influence of the governor and
his primary constituency. In 1996, Carlson told several Council members that
"he didn't want their efforts to restrain sprawl to anger suburban legislators,"
which they saw as a "clear signal to tread gently on the delicate subject of
land use." Lynda McDonnell, Can We Live with the Limits?, PIONEER PRESS
(St. Paul), Nov. 23, 1996, at 1A.
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an articulate proponent of balanced growth, 148 he has recently
149
opposed aggressive regional planning in the Twin Cities area.
Perhaps it should be no surprise that the Council has been
ineffective in implementing the Act. It has fallen prey to the
same phenomenon that threatens many regulating agencies.
One influential school of political science, interest group theory, posits that lawmakers often "pass the buck" to agencies
when they want to avoid the bad consequences legislation
might have on their electability. 150 This is especially true
where the target of the legislation represents a cohesive and
powerful interest group and the beneficiaries represent a broad
class of individuals. The incentives are very high for the targeted interests to exert pressure on the legislature to defeat
adverse legislation, 151 or at least vaguely to delegate authority.1 52 Because the stakes on the other side are much more dif53
fuse, there is no focused incentive for a countervailing lobby.
Once authority has been delegated, the regulated interest continues to enjoy a comparative advantage because of its proximity to the regulating body.1 54 As the relationship develops over
time, the regulator becomes almost an agent of the regulated.1 55
The implementation of the Act neatly follows this pattern.
Pressing regional problems of unfettered urban growth caused
the state legislature to adopt remedial legislation.15 6 However,
heavy pressure from the developing suburban municipalities148. See Mike Kaszuba, Met Council Chair's Affordable Housing Agenda
Faces First Test, STAR TRIEB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 28, 1995, at 1B (describing
the chair, Curt Johnson, as a "budding expert on aggressive solutions to fix
urban America").
149. See id. ("Johnson and the Met Council are again preaching moderation."). Johnson administered the agreement with Maple Grove; moreover, he
previously worked as the governor's chief-of-staff. Id.
150.

DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A

CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 81 (1991).
151. See id. at 23 (discussing the theory that small groups tend to dominate political activity because of their organizational advantage).
152. See LOWI, supra note 144, at 92-93 (identifying the problem of broad
delegation).
153. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 150, at 23 (explaining that collective action theories suggest "that it should be nearly impossible to organize
large groups of individuals to seek broadly dispersed goods").
154. See LOWI, supra note 144, at 107-09 (portraying the kind of regulatory
"bargaining" that avoids the creation of strong regulation).
155. Id. at 112.
156. See supra note 83 (describing the regional problems besetting the
metropolitan area).
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the interests that would most heavily feel the sting of the Actcaused the bill's authors to dilute the statutory enabling language.157 The resulting legislation left the Council with a great
deal of latitude to interpret its power, which has deteriorated
under municipal resistance and inadequate support from the
legislature.1 58 The Council now seems to have conceded to the
159
expansionist vision of the interest groups it once regulated.
IV. FINDING A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION TO
ENFORCE THE METROPOLITAN
LAND PLANNING ACT
A. THE BENEFITS OF A PRiVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
A close look at Minnesota's failure to adequately control
growth shows that the road to sprawl is often paved with good
legislative intentions. Nevertheless, Minnesota's difficulties
provide a valuable lesson for other states: without external legal avenues into growth control plans, their benefits might
never be realized. The most notable structural difference between the successful Oregon and unsuccessful Minnesota
schemes is Oregon's private party access to the courts. 6 ° A
private citizen's right of action would aid in curing deficiencies
in any agency-driven state antisprawl program, including
Minnesota's program.
A private right of action would provide several advantages
for most actors in the growth management process. Most obviously, it would rehabilitate the Act by filling in the enforcement gap created by the Council's passivity.'61 By removing
the power to enforce the Act from the sole possession of the
Council, a private right of action would supplement official ac-

157. During the floor debate in February 1976, Representative Casserly
spoke repeatedly of the extensive compromise on which the bill was founded.
House Debate, supra note 89. Casserly claimed that 115 amendments had
been made to the bill, after 15 to 20 committee and subcommittee meetings.
Id.
158. See supra notes 139-144 and accompanying text (outlining the institutional history of the Council).
159. See supra notes 113-116 and accompanying text (demonstrating the
Council's emphasis on growth over control).
160. See supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text (describing the legal
access Oregon's land-use system provides private parties).
161. See supra Part III.B.1 (describing ambiguities in the language of the
Act and the Council's restrictive interpretation of its own authority).
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tion.162 It would, in fact, provide the only realistic enforcement
mechanism, official or not. 6 ' In a fundamental way, then, a
private right of action would create the judicial teeth the legislature intended.
The effect of private actions on the Council's behavior
would be manifold. First, private suits would police both the
contents of the Council's metropolitan system plans and the
Council's reluctance to force compliance when local governments ignore the system plans. Private actions would keep the
Council honest and encourage it to more aggressively pursue
its planning agenda. In the long run, private litigation might
complement rather than clash with the Council's current conciliatory approach to working out disagreements with municipalities) 64 It would conserve substantial financial and political
resources for the Council, 165 allowing the agency to focus more
closely on the planning aspects of its mission. In addition, the
threat of an externally imposed land-use plan or control in the
form of a privately obtained court injunction, might improve
the Councirs bargaining position.
Most importantly, private actions provide a vital opportunity for citizens to become directly involved in a matter of intimate concern to them: the fair and balanced growth of the region in which they live. Citizens are the ones who ultimately

162. See supra note 80 (outlining the rationales behind citizen suit provisions).
163. For example, in New Jersey, the State Supreme Court, impatient
with official foot-dragging, created a builder's remedy to enforce the court's
mandatory inclusionary zoning decisions. See supra note 64 (describing New
Jersey's unique private land-use action). Professor Charles Haar writes that
by "harness[ing] the personal profit seeking and affimative commitment of
the private market" this remedy has become the linchpin in the court's effort
to introduce affordable housing into the suburbs. CHARLES HAAR, SUBURBS
UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES 146 (1996); see also Arthur C. Nelson, Comparative Judicial Land-Use Appeals Processes, 27 URB.
LAW. 251, 258 (1995) (claiming that the builder's remedy has become the
state's most effective enforcement measure). Given that the builder's remedy
empowers only self-interested private parties, one commentator argues that
the remedy is a mixed blessing, "skew[ing] the system" by providing builders
with an incentive to sue but providing other private parties nothing. John M.
Payne, Norman Williams, Exclusionary Zoning, and the Mount Laurel Doctrine:Making the Theory Fit the Facts, 20 VT. L. REV. 665, 677-78 (1996).
164. See supra Part II.A-B (describing the Council's currently passive approach toward municipalities).
165. This is a common justification for citizen suits. See supra note 80
(sketching the rationales).
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bear the costs of inefficient and unfair land-use decisions.'
The legislature passed the Act in the interest of the "health,
safety, and welfare of the residents of the metropolitan area."67
A private action would allow public participation in a land
planning process that to this point has been open only to an
unelected Council, largely insulated from public pressure but
vulnerable to special interests, and the local planning bodies,
who are expected to act in the best interests of only their community. 168 Foreclosing private third parties from these decisions seems undemocratic. Also, the substantive result of the
negotiations
between the Council and municipalities will likely
169
suffer.
The ultimate purpose behind the Act is to promote good
development through smarter planning.170 As the Oregon experience amply demonstrates, private actions make state and
region-wide comprehensive planning legislation more effective
by creating a factual context in which the laws can develop and

166. "[W]e all bear the costs of [unbalanced growth]: of idle land where obsolete industry has closed, of communities isolated from the broader social
and economic network, of inefficient transit, and of deterioration in neighborhoods no longer attracting the residential investment dollars necessary for
adequate maintenance." Dave McDonnell, Council's Plan Is a Good Start,
PIONEER PRESS (St. Paul), Nov. 24, 1996, at 16A. "Experts estimate existing
large lots around the Twin Cities have pushed future infrastructure costs up
by $650 million." McDonnell, supra note 147, at 1A; see also supra Parts I.BC (discussing the costs of ineffective land-use controls on the larger community).
167. MINN.STAT. § 473.851 (1996) (emphasis added).
168. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (discussing the rational
choices made by local governments).
169. The recent public hearings on the planned MUSA expansion are demonstrative. While the Council paid heed to the well-funded builder's study
that suggested 500,000 acres of new land were necessary for urban growth, it
also learned for the first time that 78% of focus group participants believed
that outward growth had not been good for the core cities. Kaszuba, supra
note 111, at lB.
In Maple Grove, a private action would have directly introduced into the
planning process both the ideas of private developers, who desired to build
high-density housing in the affluent suburbs, and private citizens, who have
an interest in obtaining or promoting lower income housing in that community. Adding these perspectives to the legal pressure of a potential private
action would have improved the chances for a more satisfactory resolution of
the Maple Grove affair. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text
(describing the compromise, which disappointed many).
170. See supra notes 83-91 and accompanying text (describing the purpose
behind the Act).

1997]

LAND-USE PLANNING

1369

adapt. 17 1 Private actions would help clarify the ambiguous
terms of the Act, such as "metropolitan system statement" and
the "substantial departure" of local plans therefrom.1 72 With
these terms clearly and practically defined through case law,
the planning regime envisioned by the Act could develop in an
orderly yet flexible way. Localities themselves would benefit
from such a process: they could turn to a body of legal authority separate from the Council, with its inevitably shifting political and policy directions, to obtain a reliable sense of how to
plan for growth in their jurisdictions. In this sense, a private
Act's goal to "provide assistance to
action would help fulfill the
173
units."
governmental
local

B. CREATING AN EXPRESS PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
The legislature could amend the Act to provide for a private action. This amendment would allow suits in district
court against both the Council and any local government whose
land-use decisions conflict with the metropolitan system plans,
whether those decisions are made in zoning or planning contexts. Standing to bring suit should be broadly granted to "any
person" in the metropolitan region-such wording encourages
the access-limiting doctrine of legal injury174 to be applied as
171. See supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text (describing Oregon's
legal regime).
172. See supra Part IH.B.1 (analyzing the debilitating ambiguity of key
statutory terms).
173. MINN. STAT. § 473.851 (1996).
174. "[Injury in fact [is] the test for standing in [Minnesota], absent discernible legislative intent to the contrary in a given case." Snyder's Drug
Stores, Inc. v. Minnesota State Bd. of Pharmacy, 221 N.W.2d 162, 165 (Minn.
1974). Although Snyder's Drug apparently meant to establish "injury-in-fact"
as both the default and the minimum for plaintiff standing, Minnesota courts
have allowed very attenuated injuries to satisfy the test. The most striking
example appears in the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA), where
the state legislature created a private right for "[any person residing within
the state" to sue if damage that could have been avoided occurs to intrastate
environment. MINN. STAT. § 116B.03; see Minnesota Pub. Interest Research
Group v. White Bear Rod & Gun Club, 257 N.W.2d 762, 771 n.6 (Minn. 1977)
(endorsing MERA's broad standing provision).
Under a proposed amendment to the Minnesota sprawl control statute, a
private action clause would echo MERA, expressly extending to all residents
of the metropolitan area a right to a healthy urban environment. Because
each resident suffers from inefficient sprawl, an injury would come when a
municipality deviates substantially from the metropolitan plan. Private
plaintiffs would at a minimum, however, have to assert a substantial deviation in their pleadings (and survive a motion to dismiss) in order to meet the
standing requirement. This pleading threshold would allow wide private ac-
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liberally as possible, ensuring maximum participation by private citizens. 75 Legislation providing citizens with a right of
action in an area already regulated by agency is not unprecedented in Minnesota. 176 Nonetheless, two recent attempts to
private involvement in land-use planning
explicitly encourage
177
have failed.
C. IMPLYING AN CAUSE OF ACTION

An argument can be made that a private cause of action is
already permitted by the Act. Although generally hesitant to
imply private rights of action, Minnesota courts use a threepart test derived from the United States Supreme Court decision in Cort v. Ash to determine whether one exists. The Cort
test evaluates: 1) whether the plaintiff belongs to the class of
statutory beneficiaries; 2) whether the legislature intended to
create a private action; and 3) whether a private action comports with the purpose of the act.'7 8
In the context of Minnesota's Metropolitan Land Planning
Act, the first prong of the Cort test seems to be met: private
citizens residing in the metropolitan region are members of the
class which the Act intended to protect.7 9 Minnesota courts
cess while simultaneously screening out "crank" or merely obstructionist
cases, always of concern to citizen suit opponents. See SAX, supra note 80, at
115-21 (responding to these common criticisms). If the anxiety about meritless cases becomes legislatively debilitating, lawmakers might consider adding
a clause that allows the winning side in a private enforcement action to recover attorney's fees. Although such a provision might discourage some valid
private suits, it might also discourage some invalid local government defenses.
175. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the advantages of broad public participation in the process).
176. See supra note 174 (describing how MERA gives state residents the
power to enforce environmental rights).
177. See S.F. 449, 78th Leg. (Minn. 1993) and H.F. 2126, 78th Leg. (Minm.
1994) (bills adopting private litigation as part of the land planning review
process). Neither failed attempt, however, could fairly be interpreted as a
legislative repudiation of the concept. The private action provision of S.F. 449
was dropped in subcommittee. Minutes of Minnesota Legislature's Senate
Subcommittee on Metropolitan Affairs Hearing Regarding S.F. 449 (March 4,
1993) (on file at State Office Building). Representative Myron Orfield
authored H.F. 2126, a statewide land-use planning bill modeled on Oregon's
statute. See Sprawl Control, supra note 108, at 14A. The bill was offered
primarily as "a vehicle for debate and discussion." Id.
178. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975); see supra note 106 (summarizing
Minnesota's implied private action doctrine).
179. One of the Act's explicit purposes is to "protect the health, safety, and
welfare of the residents of the metropolitan area." MIUN. STAT. § 473.851
(1996).
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have declined to grant private actions to litigants who benefit
only indirectly from statutes purporting to broadly serve the
public interest. 180 Unlike many statutes, however, the Act does
not purport to benefit the public as a whole, 81 but instead pur182
ports specifically to protect the "residents" of the region.
Residents who can plead that their personal health, safety, or
welfare has been compromised should squarely fall within the
statutory class of intended beneficiaries.8 3
The second Cort prong, which searches for an indication
that the legislature intended to create or deny a private action,
presents a more difficult problem. The Act itself18 and its legislative history'8 5 are silent as to whether private citizens
should be involved in enforcing the Act. Legislative silence itself, however, does not counsel courts to imply causes of action;
in fact, as one Minnesota court states, implying from silence is
180. See, e.g., Flour Exch. Bldg. Co. v. Minnesota, 524 N.W.2d 496, 499
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that the owner of a historic building does not
fall within the class meant to be benefited by a historic preservation statute);
Counties of Blue Earth v. Minnesota Dep't of Labor & Indus., 489 N.W.2d 265,
268 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that although counties enjoy an indirect
benefit from the Prevailing Wage Statute, they are not members of the class
to be benefited).
181. In Blue Earth, the Prevailing Wage Statute stated that it is "in the
public interest" that public buildings be constructed by workers making the
prevailing wage. MINN. STAT. § 177.41 (1990). In Flour Exchange, the historic preservation statute at issue mentions no specific beneficiary other than
historic structures. MINN. STAT. § 16B.24, subd. 6(c) (1994). The court added
the "public" class by inference, stating that the statute was designed to
"benefit the state as a whole by encouraging the use of historically significant
buildings." FlourExch. Bldg. Co., 524 N.W.2d at 499.
182. MINN. STAT. § 475.851 (1996). The Blue Earth court indicated that,
unlike counties, public workers might be considered a benefited class because
they were specifically mentioned in the statute. 489 N.W.2d at 268.
183. Residency, in fact, provides the only class criterion in the citizen-suit
provision of MERA. See supra note 174 (describing MERA).
184. At one point, the Act opens the process to "all interested persons."
MINN. STAT. 473.857 (1996). Under the principle of expressio unius, Minnesota courts have stated that the legislature's identification of one channel of
private legal access demonstrates an intent to foreclose other ones. See e.g.,
Haage v. Steies, 555 N.W.2d 7, 9 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996). This provision of the
Act, however, provides the private party with only a very narrow opportunity
to be heard before the agency, and no express power to appeal to a court. See
supra note 103 (detailing the provision).
185. As legislators debated the bill's language and provisions, they focused
intently on the nature of the relationship between the Council and the local
municipalities. House Debate, supra note 89. Opponents voiced concern
about creating a "supergovernment." Aron Kahn, "Sprawl" Curbs Passed,
PIONEER PRESS (St. Paul), Mar. 26, 1976, at 1. That is, they worried about
top-down enforcement, not bottom-up.
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"a hazardous enterprise, at best."18 6 The Act's preamble does
not specifically identify the Council as the only agent who
might pursue the goals of the Act.18 7 Nevertheless, the legislature's express delegation of enforcement discretion to the
Council l88 indicates it intended to leave the matter in the
Council's hands.
The 1995 amendment to the Act, however, suggests a role
for private enforcement by stating, "If the comprehensive municipal plan is in conflict with the zoning ordinance, the zoning
ordinance shall be brought into conformance with the plan by
local government units .... " Reversing the historical priority
of local zoning decisions over comprehensive plans," 9 the
amendment creates a consistency requirement between zoning
controls and local comprehensive plans. 190 Because local plans
must now conform with metropolitan plans, zoning decisions,
in effect, are subordinate to metropolitan plans. 191 This new
zoning criterion has important implications for the issue of private statutory enforcement. Surprisingly, even though the
amendment creates a new obligation for municipalities, the
legislature placed it outside the provision giving the Council
discretion to require modification of local comprehensive
plans. 192 The standard is set out, moreover, using the strong
mandatory term "shall."193 This new language suggests neither
express delegation to the Council nor optional enforcement.
That is, the legislature no longer textually bars the possibility
of private enforcement.
186. Flour Exch. Bldg. Co., 524 N.W.2d at 499 (quoting Touche Ross & Co.
v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571 (1979)).
187. MINN. STAT. § 473.851 (1996). As an alternative to adding an express
private cause of action, the legislature might add language to the preamble
suggesting the possibility of private enforcement. Minnesota courts have
found statements of purpose to be valid indicators of legislative intent. See,
e.g., Hovet v. City of Bagley, 325 N.W.2d 813, 815 (Minn. 1982) (considering
the statement of purpose in the Minnesota Recreational Use Statute in determining it did not apply to cities).
188. See supra notes 95-96, 129-130 (discussing the enforcement language
of the Act).
189. See supra note 105 (identifying Minnesota's comprehensive planning
doctrine prior to the 1995 amendment).
190. See supra notes 99-100 (describing the amendment and its background).
191. MINN. STAT. § 473.858 (1996).
192. Moreover, while the old requirement language fell within the Metropolitan Council's subchapter, § 473.175, the new language appears in the general Metropolitan Land Use Planning subchapter, § 473.858.
193. MINN. STAT. § 473.858.
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Furthermore, the 1995 amendment potentially paves the
way for a major change in Minnesota's substantive land-use
law. 19 4 Until now, Minnesota courts have presumed the validity of local zoning decisions.' 95 By statutorily prioritizing
planning over zoning, however, the new amendment operates
like the holding of Fasano,the Oregon decision that opened up
that state's planning process to private litigants. 196 If local
zoning must conform to a Council-approved comprehensive
plan, a local government must interpret the plan in order to
zone. Because interpretation is a judicial function, not a legislative one, 197 the rationale behind judicial deference no longer
applies. Under the Minnesota Supreme Court's own reasoning,
therefore, zoning decisions should now be construed strictly
against the local government and in favor of the private challenger. 9 8 At the very least, Minnesota courts should recognize
the legislature's strong signal of intent to encourage private
litigation under the Act.
Whether or not the new amendment alters prior land-use
doctrine, it inarguably changes the kind of situations where a
municipality might violate the Act. Under the established system of comprehensive plan review, local governments submit
199
plans to the Council, which approves or disapproves them.
Policing zoning decisions, however, does not lend itself to such
administrative formality. Between the Council and a private
party, the latter is more likely to notice a local decision deviating from the approved plan.200 In short, the Act's previously
narrow and highly formalized legal framework now seems to

194. Specifically, the change would take place in the seven counties covered by the Act.
195. See supranote 105 (highlighting Minnesota's land-use case law).
196. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text (describing the impact
of Fasano).
197. See Amcon Corp. v. City of Eagan, 348 N.W.2d 66, 72 (Minn. 1984).
198. Id. Even in Amcon, where the court stated that comprehensive plans
are "generally viewed as advisory," id. at 74, the court found a local government's failure to explain its deviation from a comprehensive plan to be evidence of arbitrariness. Id. at 75. Now that such plans are much more than
advisory, logic dictates that the court will demand much more government
justification when the government plan fails to conform to its zoning decisions.
199. See supra notes 94-96 (describing the plan review process).
200. Consider who was on the front line in Maple Grove-the developer
and the townhouse buyers. See supra notes 1-10 (detailing the events in Maple Grove).
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invite, or even require, private participation."' This tacit invitation might fairly be construed as intent, thus satisfying the
second Cort prong.
The final Cort factor examines the propriety of implying a
private action as a matter of policy. Policy considerations point
unequivocally toward implying a private action. Not only
would private enforcement be consistent with the underlying
purposes of the Act,20 2 but without it the entire regional land
planning enterprise is imperiled.0 3 As a matter of stark reality, private citizens may now be the only parties with the will
to require municipal bad actors like Maple Grove to conform
their land-use practices to the metropolitan plan. All factors
considered, deriving a private cause of action from the Act appears not only prudent, but wholly faithful to the original legislative intent to control urban sprawl.
CONCLUSION
As the problem of urban sprawl spreads across America,
states search for an effective model of land-use planning.
Zoning ordinances and comprehensive plans bring some rationality to local land use, but increased local control allows
communities to reap the benefits of growth for themselves
while shifting the costs to neighboring communities. Because
this approach leads to unfairness and more sprawl, many lawmakers have come to realize that the pathologies of growth
cannot be cured within local boundaries. As a result, several
states have created official mechanisms to police local government planning by requiring conformity to state or regional
policies.

201. The legislative history of the 1995 amendment strongly supports
these inferences. In contrast to the debate over the original Act, the debate
over the amendment frequently involved the role of private parties. For example, one legislator forcefully argued for the amendment because under the
current regime "citizens may be adversely affected" by relying on Councilapproved comprehensive plans that cities can ignore. Audio Tape of Minnesota Legislature's House Floor Debate Regarding H.F. No. 833 (Mar. 22, 1995)
(on file at State Office Building) (statement of Rep. Carruthers). Opponents
of the bill recognized the amendment's potential for private legal action, arguing that the new legislation would be "very expensive" because it exposes the
city to more legally viable private lawsuits. Id. (statement of Rep. McElroy).
202. See supra Part IV.A (arguing that private enforcement facilitates both
compliance and good planning).
203. See supra Parts III.A-C (demonstrating the Council's chronic inability
to vigorously enforce its metropolitan plan).
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Minnesota took an early lead in this approach. The Metropolitan Land Planning Act, which gave the Metropolitan
Council potentially strong powers to bring municipalities into
line, held out great promise as a model for growth management. As the Minnesota experience demonstrates, however,
the urban sprawl is often the unfortunate result of good intentions. Saddled with ambiguous statutory language and institutionally vulnerable to special interests, the Council has
adopted a passive role in regulating growth. Without an entity
to rigorously police local planning, urban sprawl in the Twin
Cities proceeds almost unchecked.
Oregon's success in reigning in urban sprawl stands in
stark contrast to the situation in Minnesota. Although structurally quite similar to Minnesota's system, the Oregon statutory scheme has been supplemented by court decisions that
dramatically increase private citizens' access to the local landuse process. Private enforcement of Oregon's growth control
policies has virtually halted sprawl in the thriving metropolitan area of Portland.
Drawing lessons from both states, this Note proposed a
private right of action to fill the enforcement gaps left by official management of sprawl control. Private enforcement relieves state and regional planning agencies of substantial
regulatory burdens, while permitting them to devote more resources to good planning. Moreover, it involves private parties
in the planning process, guaranteeing better planning. In
Minnesota, either the legislature or the courts should add a
private enforcement mechanism to the Metropolitan Land
Planning Act. With this mechanism, Minnesota can once again
become an example of how to solve urban sprawl.

